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INTRODUCTION  
Events such as September 11th, high-profile 
corporate collapses such as HIH, the subse-
quent turmoil in our insurance industry and 
the recent financial reporting debacle in the 
USA, have acted as a stark and sudden re-
minder of the unpredictability of the world 
around us and of the construction industry’s 
vulnerability to it. Those companies that 
have over relied on insurance to manage 
uncertainty are now counting the costs and 
are being forced to review their risk man-
agement practices by financers and insur-
ance companies that are reconsidering their 
risk coverage, reducing claim payments and 
increasing their fees (Lawson, 2002). While 
risk management is increasingly practised 
in the construction industry, albeit in an un-
sophisticated way, knowledge of crisis man-
agement practices is less widespread 
(Loosemore, 2000). Given the current secu-
rity concerns surrounding major buildings 
and infrastructure in Australia, this is an 
aspect of risk management which justifies 
special attention at the moment. However, 
even in “normal” times, it is an area of prac-
tice to which construction companies should 
give more attention. 
Organisational crises are a special type of 
risk which manifest themselves into decisive 
periods of acute difficulty that threaten the 
viability of an organisation, its business 
units or key products and even the lives of 
people (Fink, 1986; Aguilera and Messick, 
1986). They are low probability, high impact 
events which create the need for critical and 
rapid analytical decision-making skills, the 
results of which are likely to fall under ex-
tensive public, media and/or government 
scrutiny (Perrow, 1984; Pauchant and Mi-
troff, 1992; Irving, 1997; Pearson and Clair, 
1998). Consequently, crises are character-
ised by an extreme sense of urgency which 
hyper-extend an organisation’s coping ca-
pabilities, producing stress and anxiety 
among organisational actors and stake-
holders (Allen, 1990; Pearson et al., 1997).  
Although most companies would prefer to 
avoid a crisis, there is an increasing realisa-
tion that crises are becoming an inevitable 
and healthy part of organisational life, which 
have to be planned for (Frazer and Hippel, 
1984; Pascale, 1993; Furze and Gale, 1996; 
Lerbinger, 1997). This planning should be 
part of an integrated and thoroughly imple-
mented risk management process but evi-
dence suggests that many organisations 
exist in a low state of crisis preparedness, 
having an inadequate understanding of their 
risk exposure, of how to mitigate those risks 
and of the internal systems needed to cope 
with and learn and recover from their even-
tuality. While crises can destroy unprepared 
organisations they can strengthen those 
that are well prepared since a well con-
ceived crisis management plan should har-
ness potential opportunities as well as 
ensure survival (Pascale, 1993; Furze and 
Gale, 1996).  
It is within this context that an investigation 
of the crisis preparedness of construction 
companies was undertaken in Sydney. The 
objectives were to gauge attitudes towards 
crisis management and the adequacy of sys-
tems used to plan for and manage them.  
The signs of crisis proneness  
All construction companies are prone to 
crisis but to different extents, depending 
upon the nature of work they are engaged 
in. For example, a company involved in large 
complex inner city projects is likely to be 
more prone to crises than a company in-
volved in house building. However, this is 
largely dependent upon the way an organi-
sation is managed and Pauchant and Mitroff 
(1992), Mitroff and Pearson (1993) and Per-
son et al. (1997) have found that crisis-prone 
organisations have certain characteristics in 
common. In particular, they tend to be scep-
tical about risk management and character-
ised by a culture of managerial invincibility 
and fatalism. Such organisations also tend 
to have task-orientated cultures which con-
sistently stress the importance of profits 
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over other corporate goals. The mind-set 
that is nurtured is that crises are essentially 
negative in nature, that company size and 
past successes provide protection from fu-
ture crises, that crises happen to others, 
that good management and hard work pre-
vents crises and that desirable business 
ends justify the taking of high-risk business 
means. People in crisis-prone organisations 
also believe that crisis management is 
someone else’s responsibility and that they 
have the power to offload risks onto other 
parties, thereby insulating themselves from 
their environment. For these organisations, 
crisis management plans are considered a 
sign of weakness because crises are seen 
as a sign of managerial failure. To a crisis-
prone organisation, there is little justifica-
tion for the re-examination of existing or-
ganisational practices in the aftermath of a 
crisis, and rather than learning lessons for 
the future the priority is to maintain the or-
ganisation’s public image and to ensure that 
internal operations remain intact.  
In essence, crisis-prone organisations have 
an inappropriate structure and culture in 
relation to their risks and do not dedicate 
sufficient resources to proactive crisis man-
agement planning. Consequently, crisis 
management plans represent little more 
than a managerial façade and have minimal 
impact upon day-to-day organisational prac-
tices and attitudes. As Mitroff and Pearson 
(1993, xvii) point out, “in such organisations, 
CM (crisis management sic) activities may 
be designed to fool everyone, but ultimately 
they fool no one at all”. 
Crisis-prepared organisations 
In contrast to crisis-prone organisations, 
those which are prepared have a culture of 
openness, awareness and sensitivity to or-
ganisational risks and of their social and 
financial responsibilities to stakeholders 
and the wider environment (Ginn, 1989; 
Lerbinger, 1997; Pearson et al., 1997). Pro-
active risk management is systematically 
incorporated into strategic planning proc-
esses and championed by senior executives 
so that it is an integral part of organisational 
life at all levels (More, 1995). In this sense, 
senior executives provide the drive and sup-
port for crisis management by providing suf-
ficient resources and clear statements of 
fundamentally held core beliefs and atti-
tudes relating to organisational priorities. 
For example, crisis-prepared organisations 
often have a permanent crisis management 
team, charged with the responsibility of cre-
ating a comprehensive crisis management 
plan and to continuously communicate, co-
ordinate and review crisis management ef-
forts. As Osborne (1991) argues, centrally 
co-ordinated guidance is critical in creating 
corporate attitudes and managerial inclina-
tions that are able to unite an organisation 
in a decisive and immediate crisis response 
at a time of strong divisive and procrastinat-
ing forces. 
Another characteristic of crisis-prepared 
organisations is their flexibility and willing-
ness to “let go” of formal, standardised sys-
tems and procedures which serve them well 
in normal times but which become restric-
tive and counter-productive during a crisis 
(Mintzberg, 1976; Sagan, 1991). However, 
total flexibility may result in a loss of mana-
gerial control and a disjointed crisis re-
sponse, meaning that a delicate balance 
between formality and informality is neces-
sary. Such a balance facilitates effective 
horizontal and vertical communications with 
external and internal stakeholders at a time 
when existing information systems are 
stressed to the limit. During a crisis, effec-
tive communication is essential but difficult 
and companies with a track record of effec-
tive communication as an intrinsic part of 
their day-to-day life are most likely to sur-
vive (Mindszenthy et al., 1988; Aspery and 
Woodhouse, 1992; Sikich, 1993). Effective 
communication systems are particularly 
important in dealing with external stake-
holders such as emergency services, the 
public, the media and existing and potential 
customers. The media, in particular, play an 
important role in constructing the public’s 
image of events, and poor communications 
can result in distortions of the truth, unjusti-
fied mistrust, suspicion and irrevocable 
damage to customer relations. In essence, a 
crisis-prepared organisation has well devel-
oped and widely understood crisis manage-
ment plans which keep them in constant 
touch with what type of crisis it faces, when 
they begin, why they occur and who they 
affect (Mitroff and Pearson, 1993). It is the 
state of knowledge in these areas which 
represents the fundamental difference be-
tween crisis-prone and crisis-prepared or-
ganisations. 
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Crisis management planning 
The importance of a well-conceived crisis 
management plan cannot be overstated and 
it represents one of the defining charact-
eristics of a crisis-prepared organisation. 
This has been illustrated many times, such 
as in the Occidental Piper Alpha disaster 
where appropriate operating manuals on 
how to interrupt a potentially catastrophic 
sequence of events were almost totally 
lacking (Bea, 1994). Having a preconceived 
plan that can be automatically implemented 
takes away some of the initial pressure and 
shock associated with the early phases of a 
crisis. This creates a valuable “breathing-
space” within which people can calmly in-
vestigate the problem and agree on an ap-
propriate response. The importance of a 
good start in crisis management cannot be 
over-stated. During a crisis, every second 
counts and the first few hours are particu-
larly critical. This is especially true if exter-
nal constituencies are involved because 
initial impressions play a disproportionately 
large role in shaping their judgments of 
competence and blame. If initial impres-
sions are bad then an organisation will be 
judged guilty until proven innocent and in 
many instances this can intensify a crisis 
and accelerate its escalation (Loosemore, 
2000).  
Many organisations in high-risk industries 
have a permanent disaster committee that 
is responsible for championing the need for 
crisis management, identifying current pre-
paredness and vulnerabilities, devising dis-
aster plans, and coordinating people during 
a crisis (Kutner, 1996). The membership of 
such committees is an important factor in 
determining their ability to do this, and they 
should consist of senior managers, manag-
ers from all functional departments, and 
external professionals who have experience 
of crisis management, public relations, the 
law, and physical and mental health issues. 
In particular, commitment from the top of 
an organisation is essential if the activities 
of a disaster committee are to be taken se-
riously and if they are to have a chance of 
success. The various aspects of these activi-
ties are discussed below. 
Conducting crisis audits and creating crisis 
portfolios 
A crisis audit assesses an organisation’s 
crisis capabilities and identifies the inherent 
risk factors in its environment, internal  
activities, technology, infrastructure, and 
culture that need to be addressed to im-
prove its crisis preparedness (Mitroff and 
Pearson, 1993). The first stage in this proc-
ess should be to develop a working defini-
tion of a crisis from the organisation’s 
viewpoint and to then identify and rank, in 
probability and consequence terms, the 
types of crises the organisation is vulner-
able to. This involves learning from past 
events, looking into the future and exploring 
unusual combinations of events that may 
seem unlikely, but could combine to pro-
duce a serious crisis. Ranking allows appro-
priate judgments to be made about the 
relative costs and benefits of constructing a 
crisis management plan in each case be-
cause planning for every possible crisis is 
not economically rational.  
Establishing monitoring systems and  
standard operating procedures 
One aspect of the disaster committee’s job 
is to establish monitoring systems to detect 
potential crises. The disaster committee 
should also develop standard procedures 
that define precisely who should be involved 
in a crisis response, what they should be 
doing, when they should be doing it, and how 
they should be doing it. These procedures, 
in effect, establish a pre-defined emergency 
communication network that needs to be 
followed during a crisis’ early but critical 
phases, when people are disorientated by 
events. The intention is to “buy” the organi-
sation some time to come to terms with 
events, to allow people to re-orientate 
themselves, and to ensure that appropriate 
resources are mobilised quickly and that 
they are commensurate with a crisis’ scale. 
To do this, the procedures should be achiev-
able, simple, flexible, and understandable by 
all internal and external stakeholders. For 
example, in Australia and Singapore, con-
struction sites have many migrant workers 
and this may require the production of 
manuals in a range of different languages.  
Creating a command centre 
During a crisis, information is constantly 
being generated from a multitude of 
sources and it is critical that it is supplied 
“live” to the correct place, at the correct 
time, and in an understandable format 
(Davis, 1995). In this sense, a key aspect of a 
disaster committee’s job during a crisis is to 
identify a clear command centre that repre-
sents a single point of responsibility for  
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decision-making and information manage-
ment. Such centres are a critical co-
ordination mechanism that helps facilitate a 
unified crisis management effort since one 
of the greatest problems that can emerge 
during a crisis is the tendency for people to 
act independently. For example, in the case 
of a fire emergency, the command centre 
should have the sole responsibility for con-
tacting emergency services and to co-
ordinate individual supervisors who are 
charged with clearing certain areas of the 
site. In the case of an economic crisis, such 
as the bankruptcy of a major sub-
contractor, the command centre should be 
responsible for re-organizing work and em-
ploying another sub-contractor. In addition 
to being of practical importance during a 
crisis, command centres also play an 
important symbolic role. Nicodemus (1997) 
provides an example of a company that 
faced a crisis and named their command 
centre “the war room,” where they declared 
war on the problem. 
Security 
Security is another important issue for a 
disaster committee to consider since inter-
ference from unwanted elements can exac-
erbate a crisis or, at the very least, interfere 
with its management. This involves identify-
ing external constituencies who feel that 
they have a stake in a crisis’ outcome but 
who cannot contribute to its solution. While 
all stakeholders must be managed and kept 
informed, those involved in crisis manage-
ment efforts should be insulated from these 
disruptive elements so they can develop a 
strong focus on the problem.  
In some situations, it is also important that 
the site of a crisis is physically cut off from 
these elements, particularly when it contin-
ues to represent a danger to the public. In 
such situations, evacuation procedures may 
need implementing and it is essential that 
they are clearly communicated to everyone 
on a project and reinforced by regular train-
ing and mock drills. For example, public 
address systems, sirens and horns can be 
used to notify people of an incident if they 
are placed at strategic locations so everyone 
can hear them. Whatever signal is used, it 
must be as simple and as unequivocal as 
possible. Responsibilities for using them 
must be clear, as should appropriate back 
up if, as Murphy’s Law dictates, key people 
are away on the day of an incident or if  
essential equipment malfunctions. An  
important part of evacuation is the clear 
labelling of exit routes from all parts of the 
site. In particular, people should know that 
mechanical hoists cannot not be used in an 
evacuation and that all potentially danger-
ous machinery in the vicinity of escape 
routes must be switched off. Since a con-
struction site is a constantly changing 
physical environment, the positions of no-
tices and their maintenance needs constant 
monitoring. Furthermore, all evacuation 
routes should follow the shortest possible 
route to checkpoints where roll calls can be 
taken in safety. They should also be wide 
enough to facilitate an orderly evacuation of 
the building. On inner city sites this may be 
the street, and the hazards to the public, to 
traffic, and to site workers must be as-
sessed in association with public services 
such as the police.  
The potential danger of not having ade-
quately thought out evacuation plans and 
well-marked evacuation routes was demon-
strated in the Beverly Hills Supper Club fire 
in May 1977 which killed 164 people. The 
official investigation report reveals that the 
club had no evacuation plan and that em-
ployees were not schooled or drilled in the 
duties they were to perform in the case of 
fire. Furthermore, means of egress were 
not marked and the escape route itself was 
too narrow to take the number of people 
who were in the building at that particular 
point in time (Best, 1977). 
Developing a culture of collective  
responsibility 
The need to insulate a disaster response 
team from unwanted elements does not 
mean it should be allowed to become intro-
verted. Consideration also needs to be given 
to the re-organisation of non-crisis man-
agement activities so the remainder of an 
organisation can function as normally as 
possible. Crises inevitably drain a consider-
able amount of energy from other functional 
areas within an organisation, demanding 
special efforts from the people who operate 
there. Clearly, without a considerable de-
gree of peripheral goodwill and a sense of 
collective responsibility, the impact of a cri-
sis can spread to other parts of an organisa-
tion. Such goodwill cannot be expected if it 
did not exist before a crisis, and in this 
sense the crisis management process 
needs to be continuous.  
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One way of developing a culture of collective 
responsibility is to communicate everyone’s 
interdependency during a crisis and to clar-
ify and, ideally, share project risks as much 
as possible. Most crises demand an injec-
tion of extra resources into a project and if 
the disaster committee does not identify 
their source in advance, then a crisis will 
stimulate negotiations and potential con-
flicts that will delay a response.  
Decisions concerning risk distribution are 
particularly relevant to economic crises, and 
earlier we provided evidence to suggest that 
they have been a major cause of conflict 
within construction projects. We also identi-
fied a series of principles to guide risk deci-
sion-making. These principles apply at all 
points along the contractual chain, and to 
consultants as well as contractors. It is also 
important to realise that the client’s initial 
risk management practices are inevitably 
transferred along the contractual chain. For 
example, if a contractor is employed under a 
high-risk contract and has not been given 
the opportunity to price for those risks, then 
it is likely that they will attempt to transfer 
those risks along the chain by using back-
to-back contracts and similar employment 
practices with their sub-contractors. Indeed, 
sub-contractors may do the same and so 
on, until all project risks have been dissi-
pated to the end of the contractual chain. 
Unfortunately, it is here that the most vul-
nerable, crisis-prone organisations exist, 
and when problems begin to occur that de-
mand extra resources, the end result of this 
risk-cascade is inevitably a backlash of con-
flict up the contractual chain as parties deny 
any responsibility for them.  
Public relations 
Public relations are an essential aspect of 
crisis management since most types of cri-
ses have implications beyond an organisa-
tion’s boundaries. In essence, the three 
“publics” that need to be involved in a crisis 
are employees not directly affected by it, 
external and quasi-external interest groups 
and the general public. We have already dis-
cussed the first two publics and it would be 
foolish to ignore the third. As Aspery (1993, 
p. 18) argues, “crisis communications built 
on well-established relationships with key 
audiences stand a better chance of protect-
ing, even enhancing your reputation during 
difficult times. A company which decides to 
start communicating during a crisis will 
have little credibility”.  
Unfortunately, construction companies tend 
to attach little importance to the building of 
sound relationships with the media, seeing 
it as a non value-adding activity and perceiv-
ing most journalists as dangerous, untrust-
worthy, and irresponsible (Moodely and 
Preece, 1996). This rejection of the media 
tends to be particularly strong during a cri-
sis when organisations look inward and 
consciously hide from the public, seeing 
them as an unnecessary distraction to res-
cue efforts. However, this is precisely the 
time when it is most dangerous to ignore 
the media, since in the aftermath of a crisis, 
the public has a tendency to embark on a 
process of ritual damnation. This is particu-
larly true of high-profile, publicly financed 
projects in which people may feel a greater 
right to recrimination as a result of having 
paid their taxes to finance it. As Horlick-
Jones (1996, p. 61) notes, “since the aboli-
tion of capital punishment, the British public 
has turned to those in charge during lurid 
disasters to satisfy its lust for retribution. 
Find someone to blame, cries the mob, and 
off runs Whitehall to offer up someone for 
lynching”. Poor public relations have been 
the downfall of many organisations that 
have underestimated the power of the me-
dia in shaping public opinion of how a crisis 
is being handled. 
The media  
The construction industry is particularly vul-
nerable to poor media coverage because of 
its very negative public image. Furthermore, 
there is increasing scrutiny of the industry 
as a result of the ever-greater appreciation 
of its impact on the built and natural envi-
ronment (Moodley and Preece, 1996). This, 
coupled with growing sympathies with the 
environmental movement amongst the gen-
eral population, has resulted in increasing 
numbers of confrontations with the public, 
particularly on large infrastructure, mining 
and housing projects. Notably, in many of 
these increasingly common and public con-
frontations, the media has portrayed con-
struction companies in a heavy-handed and 
unsympathetic way and there is little doubt 
that the future viability of many projects will 
have been affected by this coverage. In this 
sense, media relations is an area of tradi-
tional neglect to which companies operating 
in the construction industry must turn their 
attention. Construction managers cannot 
rely upon the media to put their case and a 
continued reluctance to communicate with 
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the media will almost certainly lead to nega-
tive reporting of the industry’s activities. In 
contrast, open relationships with the press 
and more sensitivity to environmental issues 
will enable managers to better shape the 
public’s attitudes and thereby obtain a more 
balanced presentation of the facts from the 
media during a crisis.  
One way of ensuring open communication 
with the press during a crisis is to establish 
a 24-hour-a-day press office, which has the 
responsibility of providing factual and up-to-
date information to the media and to em-
ployees. If managed well, such an office 
should be able to turn media inquiries into 
opportunities rather than problems by initi-
ating, rather than reacting to, press, radio, 
and TV coverage. Public relations are best 
handled by one trained person who is 
named as an official spokesperson and who 
has skills in dealing with the media. TV in-
terviews with untrained staff who appear 
uncaring, flustered and unsure of the facts 
are damaging to the public’s perception of 
competence whereas a trained person with 
experience of such events can portray a 
positive image. The importance of identifying 
such a person was illustrated during the 
aftermath of the TWA flight 800 crash when 
the rush of distraught families, an eager 
press, and an interested public were left to 
the management of one chief ticket agent 
who, through no fault of his own, released 
inaccurate information which fuelled uncer-
tainty, anxiety and false speculation about 
the handling of the affair (Bobo, 1997). This 
was a primary reason for TWA being widely 
criticised afterward by public relations 
counsellors, crash victims’ families and the 
media for having an uncaring attitude.  
Post-crisis management  
After a crisis, a disaster committee should 
organise follow-up meetings so lessons can 
be learned and fed into subsequent crisis 
management efforts. Everyone affected by a 
crisis must be involved in this process. In 
addition to managing the learning process, 
the disaster committee should also turn its 
attention to the recovery. This can be a 
lengthy and sensitive process that is likely to 
be influenced by how well a crisis was man-
aged. For example, it may involve delicate 
challenges such as conducting investiga-
tions into causes, mending damaged rela-
tionships, re-organizing the project 
program, settling on-going disputes and re-
assessing project requirements. At the 
same time, attention must be given to the 
long-term consequences of a crisis such as 
rectifying damage to the environment, or 
dealing with government or legal investiga-
tions. Clearly, the less effectively a crisis is 
managed, the more arduous is the recovery 
process.  
Research method 
Mitroff and Pearson (1993) provided a con-
ceptual framework for investigating crisis-
proneness and understanding the major 
factors which contribute to effective crisis 
management. Essentially, they argued that 
effective crisis management is determined 
by: 
? Attitudes towards crisis management and 
the extent to which an organisation under-
stands the types of crises which it should 
prepare for, given its mission and its indus-
try. 
? The extent to which an organisation re-
sources crisis management activities and 
effectively manages the five distinct phases 
through which all crises pass, namely, sig-
nal detection, preparation and prevention, 
damage containment, recovery and learn-
ing. 
? The extent to which priorities and interac-
tions between the technological, the individ-
ual/human and the organisational/cultural 
systems are understood and managed. 
? The relative perceptions of organisational 
responsibilities to external and internal 
stakeholders. 
On the basis of these factors, Mitroff and 
Pearson produced a diagnostic model which 
identified the factors in an ideal crisis man-
agement program (See Table 1): 
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Table 1: Factors in an ideal crisis management (CM) program (Adapted from Mitroff and  
              Pearson 1993, p.114) 
Elements of an integrated 
crisis management  
program 
Key questions to ask in an integrated crisis management  
program 
Strategic actions Is crisis management integrated into corporate philosophy, 
mission statements, strategic planning and notions of corporate 
excellence? 
Is there a dedicated CM unit or team? 
Are outsiders included on the Board and/or CM unit team? 
Is training conducted in CM? 
Are there regular crisis simulations? 
Are there any diversification and portfolio strategies? 
Technical and structural 
actions 
Has a dedicated budget for CM been created? 
Are steps taken to continually develop and change emergency 
policies and manuals? 
Are there computerised inventories of plant, employees,  
products and capabilities? 
Is there a strategic emergency room or facility? 
Are steps taken to reduce hazardous products, services and 
production processes? 
Are steps taken to improve overall design and safety of products 
and production? 
Is there technological redundancy (such as computer backup)? 
Are outside experts and services in CM used?  
Evaluation and diagnostic 
actions 
Are legal and financial audits of threats and liabilities  
conducted? 
Are there continuous reviews and modifications of insurance 
policies and coverage? 
Are environmental impact audits conducted? 
Is there ranking of the most critical activities necessary for daily 
operations? 
Is there any early warning signal detection, scanning and issues 
management system in place? 
Is there dedicated research on potential hidden dangers? 
Is there critical follow-up and learning from past crises? 
Communication actions Is there media training for CM? 
Are there major efforts in public relations? 
Is there extensive information on local communities? 
Are there good relationships with intervening stakeholder 
groups? 
Is there extensive collaboration and lobbying among  
stakeholders? 
Are new communication technologies and channels used? 
Psychological and cultural 
actions 
Is there strong top management commitment to CM? 
Are there good relationships with activist groups? 
Are whistleblowers accepted? 
Is there access to knowledge of potential criminal behaviour? 
Is the human and emotional impact of crises recognised? 
Is there psychological support for employees? 
Is there stress management and management of anxiety? 
Is there a corporate memory of past crises and dangers? 
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Table 2: Sample company profiles 
Company Workforce Annual Turnover 
(AU$mill) 
Company age 
(years) 
A 112 60 80 
B 300 250 72 
C 600 900 47 
D 400 300 42 
E 1000 1500 40 
On the basis of Mitroff and Pearson’s diag-
nostic model and key questions, semi-
structured interviews were conducted with 
fourteen senior managers, in five large and 
well-established international construction 
companies based in Sydney, Australia. 
Company documents relating to crisis man-
agement systems were also inspected. 
Those interviewed were selected because of 
their seniority and specific responsibility for 
risk management in their company. This 
targeted sampling strategy ensured that 
respondents had a good understanding of 
their organisation’s crisis management sys-
tems. The purpose of the interviews was to 
investigate attitudes towards crisis man-
agement activities and the adequacy of any 
existing crisis management systems.  
The company profiles are provided in Table 
2 and were selected because their risk ex-
posures would justify crisis management 
policies of a sophistication equivalent to 
those advocated in Mitroff and Pearson’s 
model. Smaller companies involved in rela-
tively low risk projects would not justify sys-
tems of the type advocated by Mitroff and 
Pearson. 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
What follows is a general discussion of the 
strengths and deficiencies which emerged 
in the crisis management planning of the 
sampled companies. These are organised 
around attitudes towards crisis manage-
ment, resources dedicated to crisis man-
agement activities and learning processes 
instigated during the aftermath of crises. 
Attitudes towards crisis management 
56% of respondents believed that crises 
were inevitable and 65% believed it possible 
and worthwhile to plan for their eventuality. 
Although this indicates reasonably low lev-
els of managerial complacency, 28% had 
considerable sympathy with the idea that 
crises could be eliminated and 21% consid-
ered it difficult to plan for their eventuality. 
Their attitude was that it was best to  
respond to crises as they arose and that 
crisis plans were best developed on an ad 
hoc basis in response to the peculiar prob-
lems which each crisis presented. These 
respondents also felt that insurance provi-
sions were adequate to cover the costs of a 
crisis, an attitude which is all too typical in 
the construction industry. This reliance 
upon insurance is worrying given recent 
world events and research which indicates 
that the average insurance payout only cov-
ers approximately 60% of the costs of an 
insured event (Odeyinka, 2000). Even more 
worrying was the belief that crisis manage-
ment was a specialised activity that was the 
province of very large companies in higher 
risk industries and that policies of not over-
committing to excessive workloads or single 
contracts, above a certain proportion of 
turnover, insulated them from the occur-
rence of serious crises. The respondents 
were working in the largest 5% of compa-
nies in one of Australia’s most high-risk in-
dustries. 
Resources for crisis management 
There was no evidence in any company of 
permanent crisis management teams and 
little evidence of any corporate crisis man-
agement planning. Rather, crisis manage-
ment was treated as a reactive activity and 
the assumption was made that in the event 
of a crisis, the organisation would be able to 
respond adequately with existing resources 
and that plans could be created “on-the-
spot”. Crisis management planning was at 
best rudimentary, crisis plans taking the 
form of general informal procedures and 
“unwritten policies” incorporated into the 
mainstream operating procedures of each 
company. The vast majority of managerial 
effort had been invested in the formulation 
of “company policies” for health and safety 
problems (46%) industrial relations disputes 
(40%) and IT failure (14%), rather than in 
detailed contingency plans.  
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Although there was little evidence of thor-
ough crisis management planning, two 
companies had attempted to create work-
improvement teams to facilitate communi-
cation between different functional areas, 
and with union delegates, and to enable 
employees to highlight potential problems 
with, and solutions and improvements for 
working practices. However, respondents 
felt that company cultures were unsympa-
thetic to the communication of “bad news” 
and that this largely mitigated the benefits 
of such activities. To avoid this problem, one 
company had developed plans through a 
consultative team that permitted workers to 
voice their concerns with impunity so that 
issues could be raised before they became a 
potential threat.  
Crisis management training was also rare, 
although in one company chief executives 
had undergone extensive media and worst-
case scenario training and had experienced 
simulations of potential crises. Similarly, 
another company held risk-awareness 
workshops every six months for chief execu-
tives. However, in all cases such training 
was insular, being confined to the most sen-
ior levels, thereby limiting its potential value 
and impact. Only one company had an inte-
grated communications policy, which in-
volved issuing strict guidelines to all 
organisational levels about dealing with the 
media. This company also provided lists of 
emergency phone numbers for contact dur-
ing a crisis, and specialised training at all 
organisational levels, particularly in the ar-
eas of industrial relations and health and 
safety but not specifically in crisis manage-
ment. None of the companies maintained 
regular and planned contact with external 
stakeholder groups, all confining policy 
communications with personnel employed 
on a consistent basis in their normal day-to-
day activities. In this sense, little account 
seemed to be taken of a company’s potential 
impact upon and responsibilities to the 
emergency services, general community, 
minority groups and the environment.  
Learning from past crises 
93% of respondents were aware of past cri-
ses, causes being classified as accidents 
(46%), economic conditions (38%), disputes 
(industrial and others) (8%) and financial 
management (8%). Those with direct experi-
ence of these past crisis indicated that the 
problems of crisis management had been  
in damage containment rather than in  
detection, because they had been largely 
anticipated in existence but not in impact. 
However, two companies had tackled this 
problem in the area of industrial disputes by 
developing plans to prevent them spreading 
between sites. In terms of learning and re-
covering from crises, the general perception 
was that this was a natural long-term proc-
ess which necessitated little assistance. 
However, there was considerable evidence 
to indicate that learning had become a prob-
lem in many of the companies. Despite 
there being widespread confidence in being 
less vulnerable to similar future crises 
(58%), few of the interviewees had direct 
experience of past crises and had only be-
come aware of them through company 
“folklore” and informal communication net-
works. Furthermore, although there was a 
widespread (65%) and encouraging percep-
tion that the uniqueness of crises does not 
preclude lessons being learnt for the future, 
only 8% of respondents had any knowledge 
or experience of an organised learning 
process in the aftermath of a past crisis or 
were able to provide details of consequent 
changes to company procedures. As one 
respondent said, learning from a crisis “is 
the biggest job that we don’t do” and those 
changes that were highlighted by respon-
dents were considered to be relatively minor 
and part of an ongoing process of evolution-
ary development. Other evidence of crisis 
vulnerability exists in comments which di-
rectly reflect the rationalisations discovered 
by Mitroff and Pearson (1993) that hinder 
effective crisis management. For example, 
65% of respondents considered that their 
company’s size afforded protection against 
crises. Only one respondent saw a crisis as 
“a unique learning process” which provided 
a test of its plans and “an opportunity to im-
prove its plans”. Finally, most respondents 
considered that most crises were caused by 
the actions of an individual who may, for 
unknown reasons, have uncharacteristically 
made an error in performing a task. This 
reflected a widespread belief that past cri-
ses had been “freak” events which were be-
yond managerial control and that existing 
systems had, and would, continue to avert 
many other crises. 
CONCLUSION 
The study reported within this paper ex-
plored the crisis preparedness of five large, 
international construction companies oper-
ating within Australia. Due to the limited 
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sample, the extent to which the mindsets 
and systems that were discovered predomi-
nate within the construction industry is un-
clear. However, considering the relatively 
high levels of risk to which these types of 
companies are exposed, the investigation 
suggests that their state of crisis prepared-
ness is inadequate and unlikely to improve 
without external intervention. Corporate phi-
losophies evidenced in this study do not 
seem to support crisis management and 
there exists a predominant attitude that a 
long-standing record of continued survival is 
sufficient justification for maintaining the 
status quo. Furthermore, there appears to 
be a general belief that effective risk man-
agement practices can and should eliminate 
crises. The contemporary and alternative 
belief that crises are an inevitable and 
healthy part of organisational life is not 
widely espoused. Essentially, crisis man-
agement does not appear to be taken seri-
ously and is undertaken in an informal, 
fragmented fashion with few resources and 
little strategic guidance and support. The 
limited activities that are undertaken are 
preventative in focus and give little consid-
eration to coping with the eventuality of a 
crisis. Furthermore, they are insular and 
non-integrative in their development, being 
confined to senior management and are 
limited in scope to issues such as safety, 
industrial relations and, to a lesser extent, 
cost control. They also appear to be limited 
to a narrow range of stakeholders and to 
largely ignore the impact of a crisis upon the 
wider community. In essence, there appears 
to be relatively little effort invested in ex-
ploring the full range of risks which face 
companies at their various hierarchical lev-
els, little understanding of the interdepen-
dency between these risks and little attempt 
to plan for their eventuality.  
Mitroff and Pearson’s (1993) work suggests, 
that in the construction companies investi-
gated in this research, a crisis would be 
likely to stimulate a period of reactionary 
chaos, social dislocation and disjointedness, 
at least in the short term. During this pe-
riod, which would prevent any rational and 
coordinated response, costs would escalate 
and people would be guided by unwritten 
rules and procedures and information pro-
vided through informal communication net-
works. The managerial challenge during 
this period would be to re-establish an  
element of control and co-ordination in  
people’s activities by attempting to commu-
nicate policies which may have been devel-
oped in isolation at a senior managerial 
level, if at all. However, in the dynamic envi-
ronment of a construction firm, 
communication is difficult, but particularly 
so during the pressures and high stakes of a 
crisis. Indeed, if the source of a crisis is at 
site level, then these problems would be 
further exacerbated by the obscurity of 
relationships between crisis planning at site 
and company level and by the need to co-
ordinate the activities of sub-contracted or-
ganisations with a wide range of conflicting 
interests.  
While many construction companies may 
have survived and indeed prospered for 
some time with the above mindset, contin-
ued success in an increasingly changeable 
and competitive world will demand the 
elimination of potential resource wastage 
and the maximisation of potential opportuni-
ties. Highly successful companies are able 
to turn problems to their advantage and fully 
exploit any opportunities they encounter. 
Crisis management capabilities are impor-
tant in this respect because crises present 
both threats and opportunities and misman-
agement can impart a heavy monetary and 
psychological toll upon an organisation and 
in extreme cases, destroy its viability. Com-
placency is dangerous and it is evident that 
construction companies could benefit from 
systematically incorporating crisis man-
agement activity as a part of their strategic 
planning process so that it is an integral and 
continuous part of organisational life at all 
levels. Such a change needs to be driven by 
senior management, supported by appropri-
ate resources and guided by clearly expli-
cated mission statements of central core 
beliefs, attitudes and organisational priori-
ties and well conceived, fully integrated cri-
sis management strategies, systems and 
procedures. There is also a role for re-
search in bringing about this change. In par-
ticular, research is needed into how to make 
the construction industry’s culture more 
optimistic, less inwardly and short-term 
orientated, and less cost-driven. Such re-
search would have to be broad-ranging and 
cover issues such as employment and con-
tractual practices, methods of organisation 
and procurement systems, attitudes to-
wards risk and risk management practices, 
training, education, the nature of construc-
tion markets and corporate strategy. 
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